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TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the people of Northern Ireland have expressed their
political beliefs by painting large murals on the sides of buildings.' Some
murals serve as paramilitary propaganda, and others are memorials to those
whose lives were taken over the past forty years.2 Regardless of their
purpose, all are reminders of the violent, tumultuous history of Northern
Ireland. To the residents of Northern Ireland, it was likely incomprehensible
that their home would ever be thought of as a land of peace.
Only twelve years ago, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom
signed the Good Friday Agreement, formally ending thirty years of violent
conflict between Catholics and Protestants known as "the Troubles."3
Despite the abandonment of armed resistance by most factions and the
endorsement of peaceful progress, the Northern Irish peace process is
delicate, wavering between deliberate progress and halting distrust.
4
This Note examines three agreements between the United Kingdom, the
Republic of Ireland, and the political parties of Northern Ireland: the Good
Friday Agreement, 5 the St Andrews Agreement,6 and the Hillsborough Castle
Agreement.7 These three agreements represent a change in Northern Ireland
from war-torn squalor to burgeoning advancement. They are historical
guideposts, and only by reading them in the context of contemporaneous
events can one appreciate the tremendous effort that went into the often
1 See generally KEVIN TRAYNOR, NATIONALIST MURALS OF NORTHERN IRELAND (2008)
[hereinafter TRAYNOR, NATIONALIST MURALS] (showcasing photos by the author of the many
Catholic-Nationalist murals throughout Northern Ireland). See also KEVtN TRAYNOR,
LOYALIST MURALS OF NORTHERN IRELAND (2008) [hereinafter TRAYNOR, LOYALIST MURALS]
(showcasing photos by the author of the many Protestant-Loyalist murals throughout Northern
Ireland).
2 Compare TRAYNOR, NATIONALIST MURALS, supra note 1, at 1 (mural in memory of
Bobby Sands), and TRAYNOR, NATIONALIST MURALS, supra note 1, at 4 (depicting IRA
soldiers carrying rocket launchers and Armalite rifles), with TRAYNOR, LOYALIST MURALS,
supra note 1, at 10 (memorializing Ulster Freedom Fighter Stevie McKeag), and TRAYNOR,
LOYALIST MURALS, supra note 1, at 9 (depicting Oliver Cromwell and a quote that "there will
be no peace in Ireland until the Catholic Church is crushed").
3 Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, lr.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
751, 752 [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement] ("We reaffirm our total and absolute
commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on
political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political
puT ose, whether in regard to this agreement or otherwise.").
See discussion infra Part III (discussing the Northern Ireland peace process).
s Good Friday Agreement, supra note 3, at 751.
6 Agreement at St Andrews, Gr. Brit.-Ir., Oct. 13, 2006 [hereinafter St Andrews
Agreement], available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/standrews-agreement-2.pdf.
7 Agreement at Hillsborough Castle, Gr. Brit.-Ir., Feb. 5, 2010 [hereinafter Hillsborough
Castle Agreement], available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement-at-hillsborough-castle_5
february.201 0.pdf.
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excruciatingly slow peace process. The broadly stated, but clearly defined
goals contained within these agreements are the result of years of
negotiations and concessions on behalf of the Irish government, the British
government, and the various political parties of Northern Ireland. These
treaties, with all of their ambiguities and social norms, are what govern the
peace process in Northern Ireland. Without these three treaties, it is possible
that there would cease to be a peace process in Northern Ireland and "the
Troubles" would again be upon us.
Part II of this Note examines the recent history of relations between the
United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland. The nature
of the relationship between the three countries and the political parties within
Northern Ireland results from historical differences and alliances that are
explored in Part II. Part II begins with the Easter Rising in 1916 and
continues until 1993.
Part III continues the historical narrative, examining the three agreements
between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland that have served as
the foundation for peace and devolution in Northern Ireland. These include
the Good Friday Agreement, which ended "the Troubles;" 8 the St Andrews
Agreement of 2006, which ended a nearly five year suspension of the
Northern Ireland Assembly and established renewed principles for
devolution; 9 and the Hillsborough Castle Agreement, which finally settled a
stalemate on the issue of devolution of a justice department and the courts.1i
Part III also discusses the key deals and events that occurred before and after
each of these agreements. This Part further discusses the most recent events
in the Northern Ireland saga, including the cross-community votes in the
spring and summer of 2010, and the May 6, 2010, election of British
Parliament.
Part IV recommends what the United Kingdom and, more specifically,
the British Parliament in London should do regarding Northern Ireland. As
Sinn Fin-the largest Catholic and Nationalist party in Northern Ireland 11-
continues to gain strength, representing a more progressive party with
interests similar to England, Parliament should recognize that its interests are
aligned with those of Sinn Fin. Part IV suggests that continued popular
support for Sinn Fin demonstrates some support for a united Ireland.
8 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 3.
9 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6 ("Our discussions have been focused on achieving
full and effective operation of the political institutions [of Northern Ireland].").
10 See Hillsborough Castle Agreement, supra note 7, at 4-9 (explaining the logistics of the
judiciary).
11 See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing the relationship between Sinn Fein and
Parliament of the United Kingdom).
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II. A "TROUBLED" PAST: FROM EASTER SUNDAY TO GOOD FRIDAY
A. Rebellion and Independence for Southern Ireland
This Note begins by reviewing the Easter Rising of 1916, though the
animosity between Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants began much earlier.
In 1916, the entire island of Ireland was under the control of the British
government. 12  On April 24, 1916, Easter Monday, about 1,25.0 armed
Irishmen managed to take over and occupy key buildings in Dublin, the
capital of Ireland. 13 One of the rebel leaders, Patrick Pearse, stood outside
the General Post Office in the Dublin City Center and read a proclamation
declaring the birth of the Irish Republic. 14  The British government
responded by retaking Dublin, trying the leaders in a secret military court,
and privately executing them.' 5
Ironically, though the rebellion did not garner the support that the Irish
Republicans sought, the revulsion of the Irish people from the British
government's brutality in suppressing the rebellion led to increased support
for the previously unpopular Sinn Fain party. 16  The members "set
themselves up as a revolutionary parliament, Ddil tireann, in Dublin."'
' 7
The island of Ireland was partitioned in 1921.18 Pro-British "Ulster
Unionists" determined that the maximum amount of the island that they
12 Joseph P. Haughton, Ireland, in 11 GROLIER INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 257, 257
(13th ed. 1992) ("This partition [of the six northeast counties that form Northern Ireland] dates
from 1920-22, before which the whole island was under British rule."). The entire island,
which includes the countries of Ireland and Northern Ireland, is also called Ireland. This Note
uses the phrase "island of Ireland" when referring to the entire land mass. The Republic of
Ireland is the name of the country most commonly known as "Ireland," which is the
southernmost part of the island of Ireland and the majority of the land mass. "Northern
Ireland" is a constituent country that is part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, more commonly known as the "U.K." The other constituent countries in the
United Kingdom are England, Scotland, and Wales. Northern Ireland is the northernmost part
of the island of Ireland, which remained part of the United Kingdom even after the country
now known as Ireland split from the rest of the United Kingdom.
13 The Easter Uprising, HISTORY LEARNING SITE, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/ea
ster uprising.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
14-Id. See also THOMAS J. CLARK ET AL., THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE IRISH
REPUBLIC TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND (POBLACHT NA HIREANN) (1916), available at http://
www.firstdail.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/1916proclamation.pdf (providing the text of
theproclamation of the Irish Republic that Pearse read).
16The Easter Uprising, supra note 13.
16 Easter Rising, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic
/176916/Easter-Rising (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
17 Haughton, supra note 12, at 264.
18 An Act to Provide for the Better Government of Ireland, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67
(U.K.) (establishing one parliament for "Southern Ireland" and one parliament for "Northern
20101
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could defend was six counties in the northernmost region-four with
significant Protestant majorities, and two more with "Catholic majorities but
with substantial Protestant minorities."' 19 Thus, those six counties became
"Northern Ireland" while the other twenty-six counties remained "Ireland.
'
,
20
Diil tireann refused to accept the 1921 Act, but negotiated a treaty with
the United Kingdom, setting up the Irish Free State (which remained,
technically, a part of the British Commonwealth) and conceding that the six
northernmost counties were not under their control. 21 "[A] civil war broke
out between protreaty and antitreaty factions, led respectively by Michael
Collins and Eamon de Valera. The antitreaty faction was defeated.,
22
However, de Valera ascended to power in Ireland and managed to slowly
dismantle the English influence over the southern portion of Ireland.23 He
led the Fianna Fiil party (which is still one of the two main parties in the
Ddil Iireann), served as Prime Minister, and drafted a new constitution in
1937, in which Ireland was only formally still a part of the British
Commonwealth.24
Article 2 of de Valera's Constitution was particularly inflammatory,
claiming that "[t]he national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland,
its islands and the territorial seas.",25  Finally, in 1949, when Ireland
announced it was becoming a republic, the British Parliament passed the
Ireland Act, declaring that Ireland was no longer a part of the United
Kingdom.26
The remaining anti-treaty Irishmen and their descendants in conviction
called themselves the Irish Republican Army (IRA), but in reality, they were
a largely ineffective group of dissidents who still championed the republican
cause.27 Despite the declaration of independence in southern Ireland, as well
Ireland," and splitting the country along the current boundary between the Republic of Ireland
and Northern Ireland).
19 THOMAS HENNESSY, THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS: ENDING THE TROUBLES? 2
(2001).
20 Id. at 2-3.
21 See Haughton, supra note 12, at 264 ("Dil ireann refused to accept the new legislation,
and following a ceasefire in 1921 its representatives negotiated a treaty making the Irish Free
State a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations and allowing
the Northern Ireland Parliament to take the six northern counties out of the dominion.").
22 Id.
23 HENNESSY, supra note 19, at 4 ("[From the Treaty, de Valera] removed the Oath of
Allegiance in 1932; deleted all constitutional references to the King in 1936; abolished the
office of the Governor-General; and introduced, in 1937, a new written Constitution,
Bunreacht na hEireann.").
24 Haughton, supra note 12, at 265.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 5.
27 See TIMOTHY SHANAHAN, THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY AND THE
MORALITY OF TERRORISM 46 (2009) ("To the 'Irregulars' of the Irish Republican Army,
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as largely disparate economic and social conditions between Protestants and
Catholics in Northern Ireland,28 the region remained mostly violence-free. 29
In the mid to late 1960s, many Catholic communities in Northern Ireland
held civil rights demonstrations, which were often followed by violence
directed at them.30  Following this, the IRA grew considerably.31  The
members of the IRA who favored armed and offensive effort directed at the
United Kingdom split off from the IRA to form the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA).32
B. "The Troubles"
In 1969, following a rash of sectarian violence, the government requested
the British Army be brought in to monitor the situation and, ironically, to
defend Catholic communities.33  Thus, Operation Banner-and what the
world would come to call "the Troubles"--had begun.34 The British Army
did not leave for thirty-eight years.35 In 1972, at the peak of the violence,
over 25,700 British soldiers were in Northern Ireland.36 More than 3,000
people lost their lives during "the Troubles"-almost 500 in 1972 alone.37
defeated in the Irish Civil War (1922-3), to the IRA of the 1940s and 1950s (whose 'Border
Campaign' fizzled out in 1962) ... was bequeathed the duty to be the vanguard of this sacred
destiny in this current age.").
28 Douglas Woodwell, The "Troubles" of Northern Ireland: Civil Conflict in an
Economically Well-Developed State, in 2 UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR: EUROPE, CENTRAL
ASIA, AND OTHER REGIONS 161, 167 (2005).
29 See id. at 164 ("[N]o major ethno-national or sectarian violence took place for almost 50
years.").
30 See SHANAHAN, supra note 27, at 13 ("Inspired by Dr Martin Luther King Jr's civil rights
movement in the United States and by student protests in France, in January 1967 Catholics in
the Six Counties organised their own civil rights movement .... Their modest demands...
were viewed by unionists as a threat to their privileged position, who then responded with
violence.").
31 See id. at 14 ("A revitalised IRA arose in response to the urgent need to defend the
Catholic community ... ").
32 See id. ("[Some IRA members] emphasised the need to reorganise and rearm in order to
first defend Catholics, and to then go on the offensive against the British occupation .... The
IRA split in December 1969, with the [ I group [favoring peaceful efforts] becoming known as
the Official IRA, and the [violence-oriented] group becoming known as the Provisional
IRA.").
33 See Esther Addley, British Troops Leave After 38 Years, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (July 31, 2007,
21:32 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/aug/0l/northemireland.military ("Thirty-eight
years after 250 soldiers from the First Regiment of Wales marched up the Falls Road in Belfast
to quell sectarian disturbances, Operation Banner... was declared over.").
3 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, CAIN WEB SERVICE,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
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On January 30, 1972, fourteen unarmed Catholics were shot dead on the
streets of Londonderry-a day that would become known as "Bloody
Sunday.
38
An attempt to end "the Troubles" was made in 1985 with the Anglo-Irish
Agreement.39 It purported to be a step in the direction of peace by stating
that any change in Northern Ireland's status would come about only with the
consent of a majority of the Northern Irish people, that the Northern Irish
people wished for no change presently, and that if the people of Northern
Ireland wanted a united Ireland in the future, that wish would be supported
by all sides.40 However, the Anglo-Irish Agreement failed to discuss the
current constitutional status of Northern Ireland, leading Unionists to claim
that Northern Ireland was part of the British government, while Republicans
claimed that it belonged to the Republic of Ireland.4'
Back-channel communication continued between the political party long
associated with the PIRA, Sinn Fain, and the British government.42
Ultimately there was limited success because neither side wished to be seen
as soft or yielding to the opposition.43 Meanwhile, Sinn F6in had slowly
begun to shift toward a more peaceful type of resistance that was originally
articulated by John Hume and the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP).44 "Republicans now wanted the British Government to become
persuaders for a united Ireland." 45 Hume, the leader of the SDLP, still
believed that getting the PIRA to end their campaign of violence was
possible, and continued to talk with Gerry Adams and other leaders of Sinn
Fdin.46 The two men released a statement in 1993, further recognizing that
Unionist consent was necessary for a lasting peace, but not to the degree that
they had veto rights on any progress.47  This statement reinforced the
perception in many Catholic minds that the "armed struggle was
undermining the very idea of Irish unity.
' 8
38 Addley, supra note 33.
39 See HENNESSY, supra note 19, at 49 (stating the important aspects of the agreement,
which include that the majority of the Northern Irish did not desire a united Ireland at the
time, but in the event of a change, modifying Northern Ireland's "status" would require a
majority vote by the Northern Irish, and the legislation would be introduced by the respective
Parliaments).
40 id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 71.
43 id.
44 Id. at 72.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 75.
47 Id. at 78.
48 id.
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In December 1993, the British and Irish governments jointly announced
the Downing Street Declaration. 49 This Declaration was significant for a
number of reasons. First, it announced and declared a "common set of
principles" that both the Irish and British governments held.5° Secondly, it
destroyed the Republicans' hope of obtaining consent for a united Ireland
from the whole population of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 51 To be united,
the majority of the Northern Irish would have to want it, thus enshrining the
Protestant veto. 2 Lastly, it unequivocally declared that paramilitary violence
and the support of such violence had to cease before any progress could be
made.53
Despite being unhappy with some of the Declaration's substance, Sinn
FHin persuaded the PIRA to declare a ceasefire in the fall of 1993. 54 It was
an opportune time for Sinn Fin to lobby for outside support to strengthen
their position, as the recently elected President of the United States, Bill
Clinton, became interested in the dispute due to the efforts of several
influential Irish-American politicians,55 including Senators Ted Kennedy and
Pat Moynihan, and Congressional Speaker Tip O'Neill. 6 Sinn Fin also felt
that it was time to reach a consensus on a Republican viewpoint with both
the SDLP and the Irish government.
57
III. THREE STEPPING STONES IN THE NORTHERN IRISH PEACE PROCESS
A. The Good Friday Agreement
In 1997, the Labour Party's candidate, Tony Blair, became the British
Prime Minister, and he was intent on involving Sinn Fin in the political
49 The Joint Declaration by An Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, T.D. & The British Prime
Minister, The Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P., Dec. 15, 1993, U.K.-Ir., Cm. 2442, available at
htt ://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-ireland/downing-street-declaration.php.
HENNESSY, supra note 19, at 81.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 82.
54 Id. at 84.
55 John Darby, Northern Ireland: The Background to the Peace Process, CAIN WEB
SERVICE, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) ("[A]
small group of Irish-Americans, with key political and corporate links, was instrumental in
persuading the Clinton White House to become interested in Northern Ireland.").
56 Roger MacGinty, American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 17 J.
CONFLICT STUD. 2 (1997), available at http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory
=FALL97/articles/&filename=MACGINTY.html.
57 HENNESSY, supra note 19, at 86.
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process and establishing a permanent ceasefire between paramilitaries.58
Sinn Fin, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and the SDLP all negotiated on
the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. 59 The Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) refused to participate in the settlement talks once it realized that Sinn
Fin would be allowed to participate without cutting any ties to the PIRA.6 °
Although this contention was valid, the inclusion of Sinn Fin in the
negotiations represented "the evolution of conflict regulation based on the
necessity of consent and inclusion, rather than exclusion of proponents of
violence., 61 Despite its points of contention, Sinn Fin, the SDLP, and the
UUP all supported the Good Friday Agreement.62
The Good Friday Agreement had many aims, addressing largely
intangible questions of self-determination and national identity. First, the
Good Friday Agreement reaffirmed that the people of Northern Ireland
possessed self-determination by allowing them to choose between being a
part of either the United Kingdom or a united Ireland upon a majority vote of
the populace.63 Second, it stated that Northern Ireland would remain in the
United Kingdom for the time being, because that is what a majority of
citizens in Northern Ireland wanted. Third, it said that in the future, if the
people of Northern Ireland choose to be part of a united Ireland, both the
Irish and the British governments must acknowledge and accept that
decision.65  Fourth, it stated that every citizen of Northern Ireland had the
right to identify him or herself as British or Irish or both, and that every
citizen retained his or her dual British-Irish citizenship.66 Fifth, the Republic
of Ireland agreed to drop its territorial claim to the entire island of Ireland,
and instead, to define "the republic" in terms of the Irish people.67
58 See Martin Melaugh, The Irish Peace Process - Chronology of Key Events (April 1993-
April 1998), CAIN WEB SERVICE, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9398.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010) (providing a timeline showing Tony Blair's involvement in the peace process).
59 id.
60 A Decade on, How Is the Deal?, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/norther
n ireland/7292812.stm (last updated Mar. 20, 2008, 9:30 GMT) ("The DUP did not sign off
on a deal until the IRA disarmed and Sinn Fein accepted the police ... ").
61 BRENDAN O'DUFFY, BRITISH-IRISH RELATIONS AND NORTHERN IRELAND 168 (2007).
62 The Search for Peace: Good Friday Agreement, BBC NEwS (Apr. 1998), http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/english/static/northernireland/understanding/events/good friday.stm
63 See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 3, at 752 (explaining that both the British and
Irish governments agree to recognize the choice of the majority to either stay as part of the
United Kingdom or to be part of a united Ireland).
64 id.
65 Id. at 753.
66 Id.
67 See IR. CONST., 1937, amend. XIX (replacing Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution of
Ireland with new language, as mandated by Annex B to the "Constitution Issues" section of
the Good Friday Agreement). See also Good Friday Agreement, supra note 3, at 754
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The Good Friday Agreement established the 108-member Northern
Ireland Assembly.68 The formulation in the Good Friday Agreement meant
that the members of the Assembly were to vote for the leaders of the
executive branch-the First Minister and deputy First Minister.69 These two
individuals were to be elected on a ticket together--one from each of the two
largest political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly-and serve with
equal power (despite the fact that one is considered the "deputy"). 70 The
Good Friday Agreement also devised a plan for the appointment of ministers,
akin to the cabinet in the United States.71 These positions were to be
distributed among the parties based upon the proportional amount of seats
that each party held in the Northern Ireland Assembly.72
Three intergovernmental councils were also established: a North/South
Ministerial Council responsible for moderating discussion between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland;73 a British-Irish Council to facilitate the
relationships of all devolved governments on the two islands of Britain and
Ireland;74 and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference to encourage
cooperation between the governments of the Republic of Ireland and the
United Kingdom.75
Lastly, the Good Friday Agreement laid out goals for the devolution of
76policing and justice powers. However, it failed to provide specific
guidelines, and instead it merely stated that there were serious issues with the
current policing system and that the Independent Commission on Policing in
Northern Ireland would be enacted to examine these problems and make a
recommendation.77
The 1998 Act was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom in
November 1998, codifying the principles of the Good Friday Agreement into
law. 78 Regarding self-determination, the 1998 Act allowed the Secretary of
State of the United Kingdom to hold a poll "at any time it appears likely to
him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern
(providing the authority for the Irish Government to draft legislation to amend the
Constitution).
68 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 3, at 756.
69 Id. at 758.
70 Id. at 756.
7" Id. at 758.
72 id.
73 Id. at 761.
74 Id. at 764.
71 Id. at 765.
76 Id. at 771.
77 id.
78 Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, Introductory Text (U.K.) [hereinafter 1998 Act] ("An
act . . .for the purpose of implementing the agreement reached at multi-party talks on
Northern Ireland ... ").
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Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a
united Ireland.,
79
Shortly afterwards, the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern
Ireland, more popularly known as the Patten Commission, was established.8 °
After thorough inquiries and investigations, the Patten Commission made
175 recommendations for the reform of the police force that were published
in the Patten Report.81  One of the most important and symbolic
recommendations was to change the name from the Royal Ulster
Constabulary to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).82 The Patten
Report also recommended using symbols and badges that were free of
anything that was "too British., 83 The Patten Commission found that the
British imagery, including Union Jack flags flying over police buildings,
contributed to the "us-versus-them mentality" held by many nationalists.84
The Patten Report also recommended a new code of ethics, accompanied by
a new oath and a deeply ingrained awareness of human rights.85  Despite
these recommendations, it would be several years before these reforms
became law and were universally accepted.86
In October 2002, the peace movement suffered a serious blow. The
principles of the Good Friday Agreement provided that those participating in
the government-including Sinn Fin and, by proxy, the PIRA-would be
allowed to participate in the government "as long as they pursued republican
objectives solely by peaceful, democratic means. 87 On October 4, 2002,
hundreds of police officers raided numerous Sinn Fin leaders' homes, as
79 Id. § 1.
80 INDEP. COMM'N ON POLICING FOR N. IR., A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN
IRELAND para. 2.1 (1999) [hereinafter PATTEN REPORT], available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/a_
new beginninginpolicing_in_northern_ireland.pdf. See MARY O'RAWE, INT'L CTR.
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM AND IDENTITY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES:
LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND 1-4 (May 2009), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Pu
blications/IdentityORawe SSR.pdf ("The 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) peace agreement set
out the framework for an Independent Commission on Policing. This body, known as the
'Patten Commission,' was established in 1998 ... .
81 PATTEN REPORT, supra note 80, para. 2.1.82 Id. para. 17.6.
83 Id.
84 See id. para. 1 7.4 ("The problem is that the name of the RUC, and to some extent the
badge and the uniform too, have become politicised - one community effectively claiming
ownership of the name of 'our' police, and the other community taking the position that the
name is symbolic of the relationship between the police and unionism and the British State.").
85 Id paras. 4.6-.12.
86 See infra Part III.B.I (discussing the St Andrews Agreement).
87 Sarah Left, Suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 14,
2002, 6:35 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/I4/qanda.northemireland.
[Vol. 39:241
TOWARD A UNITED IRELAND?
well as the Sinn Fain offices at the parliament building at Stormont.88 The
police accused certain members of Sinn Fdin of gathering intelligence for the
IRA. 89 The DUP and the UUP demanded that Sinn Frin be removed from
the Northern Ireland Assembly.90
British Prime Minister Tony Blair-faced with the unenviable task of
either removing Sinn Frin from the Northern Ireland Assembly, or refusing
to remove the party and allowing the unionist parties to withdraw--chose to
suspend the entire Northern Ireland Assembly, as he was permitted to do
under the Northern Ireland Act of 2000.91 In 2005, charges against the three
arrested men were dropped due to a lack of evidence.
92
B. The St Andrews Agreement
Lengthy negotiations preceded the agreement to the terms of the St
Andrews Agreement between the British government, the Irish government,
and the parties of Northern Ireland.93 Although the members elected to the
2003 Northern Ireland Assembly elections never took their seats, they did
convene in May 2006 to elect the ministers.94 This meeting only occurred
after both the British and Irish governments pressured the political parties of
Northern Ireland to reach an agreement and elect their executives. 95
Northern Ireland's Secretary of State, Peter Hain, identified two main
goals prior to the St Andrews talks: first, the involved parties needed to
assert the recognition of the police and the rule of law across the province;
88 Rosie Cowan, Peace Process in Turmoil After Police Raid Stormont, GUARDIAN (U.K.)
(Oct. 5, 2002, 20:37 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/oct/05/northernireland.norther
nireland.
89 Id. ("[Plolice raided Sinn Fein's Stormont offices and arrested a senior party official as
part of swoop on an IRA spy ring.").90 Left, supra note 87.
91 Lynn Wartchow, Civil and Human Rights Violations in Northern Ireland: Effects and
Shortcomings of the Good Friday Agreement in Guaranteeing Protections, 3 Nw. U.J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 1, 30 (2005) ("The Northern Ireland Act of 2000 explicates the procedure for
suspension, allowing for suspension at the discretion of the Secretary of State (usually acting
in concert with the British Prime Minister).").
92 'Stormont Spying' Case Collapses, BBC NEWS, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/nort
hemireland/4509858.stm (last updated Dec. 8, 2005, 11:43 GMT) ("The prosecution offered
no evidence 'in the public interest.' ").
93 See HOUSE OF COMMONS N. IR. AFFAIRS COMM., THE NORTHERN IRELAND (ST ANDREWS
AGREEMENT) BILL 2006-7, at 7-20 (2006) [hereinafter ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER], available at
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commnons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-056.pdf (explaining the
proression to the St Andrews Agreement negotiations).
9 Id. at 3 ("The Assembly elected in 2003 finally convened in May 2006 solely for the
purose of determining the ministers .... ).
9 See id. (explaining that after numerous attempts to force the elections in Northern
Ireland, the British government passed an act specifying an election date).
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and second, they had to modify certain parts of the Good Friday Agreement
in order to further the progress of devolution.96
1. Acceptance of the PSNI by Sinn Fdin
The Patten Commission did not go so far as to recommend disbanding the
Royal Ulster Constabulary. 97  Instead, the Patten Commission suggested
reforming it as the PSNI.9  Sinn F6in maintained its criticism of the PSNI,
and when the Police Act in 2000 implemented only a partial Patten
Commission, Sinn F~in was able to argue for the full implementation of the
Patten Commission-rather than opposing the police service generally.99 The
SDLP endorsed the PSNI only a year later, which isolated Sinn Fain, but also
framed them as the guardian of republican and Catholic interests. 100 By
labeling the SDLP as having acquiesced too quickly to unionist demands,
they were able to increase their appeal to republican voters and in turn draw
support from the SDLP members.101 For several years it appeared that Sinn
Fain would be able to stall on the policing issue for so long that they would
be part of the government without ever having to alienate the most extreme
republican members of the party.
However, two events thwarted this stalling tactic. The first event was the
Northern Bank robbery that occurred in December 2004.102 The second
event was the brutal killing of a Catholic man, Robert McCartney, in a
Belfast bar by several PIRA members operating outside the PIRA's
authorization. 10 3  While both Sinn Fain and the PIRA tried to distance
themselves from the violence, this solidified their status as, at best, gangsters,
and at worst, terrorists. 04 These two events drained the PIRA and, by proxy,
Sinn F6in, of any bargaining power, because any possibility of moral
authority was completely dashed.
96 Id. at 22.
97 PATTEN REPORT, supra note 80, para. 17.6.
98 Id.
99 MARTYN FRAMPTON, THE LONG MARCH 128 (2009) ("[R]epublicans argued [that the
SDLP] had, 'lost the hearts and minds argument within the nationalist community on this
issue' and 'settled for too little too early.' ").
100 Id.
1o1 Id.
102 Owen Bowcolt & Ted Oliver, £20m Stolen in UK's Biggest Bank Robbery - Was it
Paramilitaries or Common Criminals?: Families Taken Hostage in Carefully Planned
Operation Against Belfast Bank, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Dec. 22, 2004, 5:46 EST), http://www.g
uardian.co.uk/uk/2004/dec/22/ukcrime.northernireland.
103 IRA Statement 8 March 2005, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_ news/northern_
ireland/4073012.stm (last updated July 18, 2005, 11:40 GMT).
104 See FRAMPTON, supra note 99, at 160-61 (explaining that the effect of these incidents
was to affirm the charge that republicanism was mired in criminality).
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The St Andrews Agreement said that all parties should "endorse[ ] fully
the Police Service of Northern Ireland" and "actively support[ ] all the
policing and criminal justice institutions . . . ." 05 Refusal to accept the Royal
Ulster Constabulary, and later, the PSNI, was a policy espoused by Sinn F6in
for many years. 10 6 Many of the more extreme members of Sinn F6in did not
trust the police even after reforms and despite the encouragement of the
party's leadership.' °7 Sinn F6in held a party conference, in January 2007 to
debate and vote on whether or not to back the PSNI. 10 8 Gerry Adams cited
the increase in Catholic police officers, from 8% to 20%, in an effort to
persuade party members to end their refusal to accept the police as
legitimate.' 09 On January 28, 2007, the party overwhelmingly voted to
support the PSNI. l10
2. Legal Measures Necessary for Continuing Devolution
Hain's other goal was to effectuate laws necessary to ensure the
continuing devolution of power from London to Belfast. First, the St
Andrews Agreement mandated that the Northern Ireland Assembly members
elected in 2003, but who had not served, would be treated as a transitional
Northern Ireland Assembly convened for the purposes of electing the First
and deputy First Ministers, as well as the Executive Ministers."' If these
positions were filled by March 26, 2007, then Schedule 2 provided for the
restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly and its powers. 1
2
The St Andrews Agreement also modified the way that the First and
deputy First Ministers were selected. 1 3  Clause 8 of the St Andrews
Agreement amended portions of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, which
established the nomination of the two posts together. 14  Under the St
Andrews Agreement, the party with the most seats in the Northern Ireland
105 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, para. 6.
106 Thomas William Heyck, Sinn Fein, Policing and Paisley in Northern Ireland, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., Mar. 7, 2007, at B9, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-03-07/opinion/1723
7933 1 sinn-fein-president-adams-northern-ireland-protestants-and-catholics.
107 7d.
108 Eamon Quinn, Sinn Fein Endorses Plan for Protestant-Catholic Police Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at A4, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0
3E6DE143FF93AA15752COA9619C8B63.
109 Heyck, supra note 106.
110 Quinn, supra note 108.
111 ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 93, at 25.
112 Id. at 25-26.
113 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, Annex A, cl. 8; ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER,
supra note 93, at 27.
114 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, Annex A, cl. 9; ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER,
supra note 93, at 27.
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Assembly following a general election nominates the First Minister. 15
Likewise, the party with the second-most seats nominates the deputy First
Minister. 116  After the two executive spots have been nominated, the
remaining Ministerial posts are filled using the d'Hondt method of seat
allocation." 7
The St Andrews Act (which enacted the principles of the St Andrews
Agreement into law) established the new election date as March 7, 2007,1"8
and modified the schedule for devolution of policing powers.1 19 The St
Andrews Agreement also mandated that the Northern Ireland Assembly must
provide a report to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland about the
devolution of the policing and justice powers by May 2008.120 The First
Minister and deputy First Minister had to jointly make a motion in the
Northern Ireland Assembly for this report.' 21 With the acceptance of the
PSNI by Sinn Fin, the scheduled elections occurred on March 7, 2007.122
As expected, the DUP won the most seats and Sinn Fin won the second-
most.1 23 In May 2007, the DUP nominated Ian Paisley for First Minister and
Sinn Fin nominated Martin McGuinness for deputy First Minister.124 They
were sworn in on May 8, 2007.125
3. The End of the Armed Campaign
The PIRA's announcement of disarmament stated that members and
supporters were to effectuate the goal of a united Ireland by "purely political
115 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, Annex A, cl. 9; ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER,
supra note 93, at 27.16 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, Annex A, cl. 9; ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER,
supra note 93, at 27.
17 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, Annex A, cl. 9; see also ST ANDREWS RESEARCH
PAPER, supra note 93, at 27 (explaining that the d'Hondt method allocates seats by
proportional representation, taking the total number of votes for a given party and applying a
mathematical formula to determine which party has the most support after each seat is
allocated, with the numbers being recalculated once every seat is assigned).
118 Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, c. 53 (U.K.) at Part 1, para. 3(1)
[hereinafter St Andrews Act].
119 St Andrews Agreement, supra note 6, cl. 7; ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 93,
at 37-38.
120 St Andrews Act, supra note 118, Part 1, para. 16(1).
121 STANDREWSRESEARCHPAPER, supra note 93, at 30.
122 Timeline: Northern Ireland Assembly, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/
northern ireland/7932068.stm (last updated Mar. 9, 2009, 9:33 GMT).
123 Northern Ireland Election Overview, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/vote20
07/nielection/html/main.stm (last updated Mar. 13, 2007, 13:35 GMT).
124 Matt Weaver, Paisley and McGuinness Sworn in as Power-sharing Revived, GUARDIAN
(U.K.) (May 8, 2007, 8:46 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.ukluk/2007/may/08/northernireland.no
rthemireland4.
125 Id.
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and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. '126 They
reiterated that they still maintained the same goals, and that they still viewed
the armed campaign as necessary at the time. 127 The decommissioning of the
PIRA's stockpile of arms was completed shortly thereafter. 128 Thus, the
PIRA's credibility was substantially bolstered by these efforts and several
independent reports.
The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) was established in 2003
"to monitor the activities of paramilitaries."' 129 After the PIRA's July 28,
2005, announcement, the IMC published a report in October, saying that it
was pleased with the progress made, but was looking for "cumulative
indications of changes in behaviour over a more sustained period of time."'
' 30
Another report was released by the IMC in February 2006, stating that there
were definite signs of peacefulness and a "clear strategic intent to turn the
organization on to a political path" despite some worries about PIRA
members still involved in crime. 3 1 The IMC's Tenth Report, published on
April 26, 2006, was even more positive, claiming, "[I]t remains our
absolutely clear view that the PIRA leadership has committed itself to
following a peaceful path."' 13 2 In October 2006, the IMC reiterated, "We
believe that the leadership [of the PIRA] does not consider a return to
terrorism as in any way a viable option. ,,33 These reassurances of the
end of the PIRA's violence greatly contributed to progress in the St Andrews
negotiations.
126 Full Text: IRA Statement, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (July 28, 2005, 10:28 EDT), http://www.gu
ardian.co.uk/politics/2005/jul/28/northernireland.devolution.
127 Id. ("We reiterate our view that the armed struggle was entirely legitimate.... The IRA
is fully committed to the goals of Irish unity and independence ... ").
128 See IRA 'Has Destroyed All Its Arms,' BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/
northern ireland/4283444.stm (last updated Sept. 26, 2005, 19:22 GMT) (discussing the
independent verification of the decommissioning of a large amount of weapons by the leader
of the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning, as well as a member of
the Catholic clergy and a member of the Protestant clergy).
129 ST ANDREWS RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 93, at 7; see generally Northern Ireland
(Monitoring Commission etc.) Act, 2003, c. 25 (U.K.) (providing that the Commission had
several functions, including monitoring functions), available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2003/25/contents.
130 INDEP. MONITORING COMM'N, SEVENTH REPORT, Cm. 546, 3.18 (2005), available at
http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/7th%20%2 /OMC%20 %2
OReport.pdf.
131 INDEP. MONITORING COMM'N, EIGHTH REPORT, Cm. 870, 3.25 (2006), available at
http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/8th%201MC%20Report.
pdf.
132 INDEP. MONITORING COMM'N, TENTH REPORT, Cm. 1066, 2.13 (2006), available at
http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/ACFEF3.pdf.
INDEP. MONITORING COMM'N, TWELFTH REPORT, Cm., 1 2.19 (2006), available at http://
www.independentmonitoringcomnmission.org/documents/uploads/IMC%2012th%20Report/ 20
pdf.pdf.
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4. Electoral Movement Away From the Middle
Failed efforts to restart negotiations and continuous movement to the
extremes of both republican and unionist sides marked the time period
following the Northern Ireland Assembly suspension until the St Andrews
talks. In the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections, the two parties
receiving the most votes were the more moderate UUP, led by David
Trimble, 134 and the more moderate Catholic, nationalist party, the SDLP.
135
The more extreme unionist party, the DUP, led by Ian Paisley, received the
third most votes, while the more extreme nationalist party, Sinn Fin, led by
Gerry Adams, received the fourth most votes.1 36 In 2003, when elections
were held despite the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the DUP
gained ten seats and Sinn Fin gained six.1 37 The UUP and the SDLP lost
one and six seats, respectively. 138 In 1998, the DUP and Sinn Fin combined
to win 35.77% of the votes in Northern Ireland. 139 By 2003, the DUP and
Sinn Fin combined to win 49.1% of the votes.140 In merely five years, the
DUP and Sinn FHin went from being the third and fourth most popular
parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland to being the first and second most
popular parties, respectively. 141 Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn
from the election results is that the suspension of the Northern Ireland
Assembly only caused a movement toward extremism on both sides. This
conclusion is affirmed by the 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly elections
where Sinn Fin gained four seats, and the DUP gained six seats. 142 The
SDLP lost two seats, while the UUP lost nine. 43 In 1998, the DUP and Sinn
134 Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1998, ELECTIONS: N. IR.
ELECTIONS, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa98.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter
Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1998] (stating "David Trimble, leader of the
UJUP ... [was] elected First Minister").
135 See id. (showing that the SDLP received 177,963 votes and the UUP received 172,225
votes).
136 See id. (showing that the DUP received the third most votes with 146,989 votes, while
Sinn FHin received the fourth most votes with 142,858 votes).
137 Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 2003, ELECTIONS: N. IR.
ELECTIONS, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa03.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter
Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 2003].
138 Id.
139 See Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1998, supra note 134 (providing the popular
vote percentages for the DUP and Sinn FHin of 18.14% and 17.63%, respectively).
140 See Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 2003, supra note 137 (calculating votes by
adding the popular vote percentages for the DUP and Sinn FHin).
141 See id. (showing that the DUP and Sinn Fin received 177,470 votes and 162,758 votes,
respectively, totaling more votes than the UUP and the SDLP).
14 Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Elections, ELECTIONS: N. IR. ELECTIONS, http://www.
ark.ac.uk/elections/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Northern Ireland Elections].
143 Id.
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Fin combined to win 35.77% of the vote, and thirty-eight seats.' 44 In 2007,
these numbers were 56.3% and sixty-four seats.
145
C. The Hillsborough Castle Agreement
In March 2008, Ian Paisley announced that he would resign as First
Minister.146 It was widely thought that Paisley's authority and power within
the DUP were fading due to both age and, by many, a view that he was too
comfortable with McGuinness.1 47  In June 2008, the DUP nominated
Northern Ireland Assembly member Peter Robinson to the post of First
Minister.1 48 Sinn Fin also chose to renominate Martin McGuinness to the
post of deputy First Minister, despite some talks that he may be replaced.
14 1
The relationship between McGuinness and Robinson soured quickly and a
stand-off ensured over how policing and justice powers would devolve. 150
This conflict was resolved in early August 2008 with the decision to have
one minister with cross-community support lead a department of justice;
however, it only served as a temporary break from disputes. 51 Sinn Fin
threatened to collapse, the Northern Ireland Assembly and reassert pressure
on London after stalls in the bargaining process. 52 The IMC's Nineteenth
Report, released in early September 2008, further relieved the worry that
Sinn Fin might try to interrupt the government by stating, "[T]he Army
Council [of the IRA] by deliberate choice is no longer operational or
functional.' 53  In November 2008, Sinn Fin and the DUP came to yet
144 See Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1998, supra note 134 (attaining these figures by
adding the number of seats and the percentage of the popular vote for the DUP and Sinn F6in).
145 See Northern Ireland Elections, supra note 142 (reaching these figures by adding the
number of seats and the percentage of the popular vote for the DUP and Sinn F6in).
146 Mary Jordan, N. Ireland's Paisley to Relinquish Leadership Roles, WASH. POST, Mar. 5,
2008, at A 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/04
/AR2008030401438.html.
147 Id.
148 Robinson Appointed Northern Ireland's First Minister, INDEP. (June 4, 2008), available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/robinson-appointed-northem-irelands-first-minis
ter-840443.html.
149 Id.
15o Executive Meeting May Be Cancelled, EVENING HERALD (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.her
ald.ie/breaking-news/national-news/polities/executive-meeting-may-be-cancelled- 1477308.html.
151 SF and DUP Closer to Justice Deal, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/no
rthern ireland/7540963.stm (last updated Aug. 4, 2008, 11:54 GMT).
152 SF Threatens to Collapse Assembly, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/no
rthern ireland/7580108.stm (last updated Aug. 24, 2008, 16:16 GMT).
153 INDEP. MONITORING COMM'N, NINETEENTH REPORT, Cm. 7464, 2.14 (2008), available
at http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/uploads/ACF 1599.pdf.
2010]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
another agreement to continue the devolution of policing and justice powers,
ending an impasse in negotiations.
154
1. The Northern Ireland Act 2009
The Northern Ireland Assembly passed the 1998 Act to devolve
legislative and executive powers, while reserving the devolution of policing
and justice powers for a later date.155 It was the intention of the St Andrews
Act, passed in 2006 to formally make the St Andrews Agreement law, to
press for the devolution of certain policing and justice powers. 56 However,
in 2009, "[t]here [was] one important, nay vital, part of the devolution jigsaw
still to be achieved. It [was] the transfer of policing and justice powers from
Westminster to Stormont."'
57
Though there were already seven different ways to select a minister for
policing and justice powers,' 58 an eighth way was added by the 2009 Act.
The new eighth method, as explained in Schedule 1 of the 2009 Act, allows a
legislative assembly member to nominate a Minister for Policing and Justice,
who must then be approved by the Northern Ireland Assembly. 159 However,
the nomination must also be approved by cross-community support, meaning
a majority of those assembly members designated as "Unionists" and a
majority of those assembly members designated as "Nationalists" must agree
on the nomination. 160
2. Identity Crisis for the DUP
The DUP was in a precarious position prior to the Hillsborough Castle
Agreement. They had recently lost some of the most "hardcore" members of
the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) party.' 61 The TUV, founded in 2007,
154 DUP and Sinn Fein Agree Power-Sharing Deal, TEL. (U.K.) (Nov. 18, 2008, 7:46 PM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northemireland/3479712/DUP-and-Sinn-Fein-agree-power-
sharing-deal.html.
155 See 1998 Act, supra note 78, Parts II, 1II (outlining the process for electing executive
authorities and Northern Ireland Assembly).
156 See St Andrews Act, supra note 118, para. 18 ("Report on progress towards devolution of
policing and justice matters.").
157 Feature, No More Dithering on Justice Powers, BELFAST TEL., Aug. 19, 2009, at 24, available
at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/viewpoint/viewpoint-no-more-dithering-on-justice-po
wers- 14457435.html?startindex- 1.
158 See 1998 Act, supra note 78, §§ 16A-18, 21, sched. 4A (providing provisions that do not
appear in the original bill but instead were inserted by the myriad of amendments made by
subsequent bills).
159 Northern Ireland Act, 2009, c. 3 (U.K.).
160 Id. sched. 1.
161 See, e.g., Results of the 2009 European Elections, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.euro
parl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/united-kingdom-en.html (last visited Nov.
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primarily consisted of former DUP members who had taken an especially
hard-line stance against dealing with Sinn Fin at any level.162 The leader of
the TUV attacked the DUP claiming that the DUP would simply "roll over
and acquiesce to Sinn Fain's demands.' 63 The TUV asserted that the DUP
was simply compromising because they recognized the possibility of losing
their position as Northern Ireland's most popular party in the upcoming
elections.' 64
3. The Agreement
For a while, it appeared as though there may be another stall if the parties
could not agree on devolution. In early 2010, the parties convened at
Hillsborough Castle in Hillsborough, County Down, to attempt to develop a
solution to the parades issue and the devolution of policing and justice
powers.165 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Irish Taoiseach Brian
Cowen were both in attendance and personally seeking an agreement
between Sinn Fin and the DUP.16 6 After three days of negotiations, Brown
and Cowen gave the two Northern Irish parties two days to formulate an
agreement or the British and Irish governments would "publish" their own.
167
When the deadline passed on January 29, 2010, Sinn Fin and the DUP
continued to negotiate, and the British and Irish governments held off.
68
20, 2010) (showing that the TUV polled at 13.66%, while the DUP polled at 18.23%, allowing
Sinn F~in to attain the highest percentage at just over 26%).
162 Lesley Foottit, Ulster Justice Deal Edges Closer, EPOLITIX (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.epolitix.
comilatestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/ulster-justice-deal-edges-closer ("Leader of the hard-line
Traditional Unionist Voice Jim Allister .... [said,] 'For traditional unionists devolving policing and
justice... is about the much deeper issue of the folly of gifting such vital and sensitive issues to an
executive and assembly where IRA/Sinn Fein - the party which still justifies their IRA's murder
of policemen and judges - holds the power of veto,' he said. 'Ending British control of policing
and justice has long been a strategic republican demand... No unionist should be facilitating the
attainment of their goal.' ").
163 Henry McDonald, Parades Deal Will Save Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland Say
Unionists, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 30, 2009, at 6, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/pol
itics/2009/dec/30/northern-ireland-parades-deal-assembly.
164 Id. ("A TUV spokesman added: 'When it comes down to the crunch we in TUV feel the
DUP will do absolutely anything to avoid elections to the assembly. They will find a deal to
save themselves.' ").
165 Parades Issue Is 'Key to Northern Ireland Breakthrough,' BELFAST TEL. (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.belfasttelegrapb.co.uk/breaking-news/uk-ireland/paradesissue-is-key-to-northem-
ireland-breakthrough-14653068.html.
166 Id.
167 Padraic Halpin & Ian Graham, Brown Leaves Belfast Two Days to Ponder Deal,
REUTERS (U.K.) (Jan. 27, 2010, 5:44 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE60P1RU201
00127.
168 Northern Ireland Power-Sharing Talks Go On, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/01/31 /world/europe/3 lulster.html.
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Finally, on February 4, 2010, both parties agreed to a deal that would save
the Northern Ireland government.169 The deal "chiefly charts a path for
creating a new Justice Department in Belfast that will take control from
Britain of the province's police and courts."17  This agreement became
known as the Hillsborough Castle Agreement (HCA). 7'
a. Devolution of the Policing and Justice Powers
Pursuant to the HCA, the First Minister and deputy First Minister agreed
to make a resolution in the Northern Ireland Assembly for a cross-
community vote on March 9, 2010, to devolve justice functions.112 If passed,
the justice and policing functions would be devolved on April 12, 2010.173
Prior to the vote on March 9, 2010, polls showed that 75% of Northern
Irish people favored the devolution of policing and legal powers from
London to Belfast, and "yes" votes were expected by all of the primary
parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly except for the UUP, who refused to
support it.174 The Northern Ireland Assembly, with eighty-eight "yes" votes
and seventeen "no" votes, ratified the agreement on March 9, 2010.175 Even
in the face of such monumental progress toward peace, terrorism reared its
ugly head-this time in the form of a car bomb planted by the Real IRA
terrorist group outside of the MI5 regional headquarters in Northern Ireland
that detonated just minutes after midnight-when powers were transferred. 76
Luckily, "no one was seriously injured or killed in the bombing."', 77
b. Selection of a Justice Minister
The HCA allowed any member of the Northern Ireland Assembly to
nominate a minister, and if they received cross-community support, they
169 Shawn Pogatchnik, Northern Ireland Deal Reached: Protestants Accept Plan to Share
Government with Catholics, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 4, 2010, 8:27 PM), http://www.huffingt
onpost.com/2010/02/04/northern-ireland-deal-rea n_450409.html.
10 Id.
171 Hillsborough Castle Agreement, supra note 7.
172 Id § 1, 1.
173 Id.
174 Patrick Cooper, Massive Support for New Northern Ireland Agreement, IRISH CENT. (Mar. 8,
2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.irishcentral.com/news/news-from-ireland/Massive-support-for-new-
Northern-Ireland-agreement-86834807.html.
... PM Hails 'Historic' Northern Ireland Justice Vote, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk news/northern_ireland/8558466.stm (last updated Mar. 9, 2010, 19:50 GMT).
176 Henry McDonald, Sinn Fein Denounces Real IRA Bombing of MI5 Headquarters,
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Apr. 12, 2010, 5:06 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/apr/l2/real-
ira-northemireland-bomb.
177 Id.
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would be named the Justice Minister. 7 8 It was widely expected that David
Ford, the leader of the Alliance Party-a party that identified as neither
nationalist nor unionist, neither Catholic nor Protestant-would be selected
by the leaders of Sinn FRin and the DUP.17 9 As anticipated, David Ford was
selected on April 12, 2010, to serve as the first Justice Minister of Northern
Ireland since 1972-the most violent year of "the Troubles."18 The HCA
also declared that the Justice Minister would hold an equal amount of
authority as the other ministers, and the Justice Minister would be permitted
to make certain "quasi-judicial" decisions without involving the rest of the
Executive.'8"
c. Parades and Other Business
The HCA arranged for a new parades commission to be formed to satisfy
the demands of unionists. 182 Accordingly, the First Minister and deputy First
Minister chaired a six-person committee and developed a mediation process
to resolve issues between parade planners and residents."8 3 In April 2010,
the six-person committee published their proposals. 84 The proposals sought
to balance a person's individual right to be free from harassment, while also
making it illegal to prevent a parade that is lawfully allowed.1 85 Protestants
typically view parading as their right, even through Catholic
neighborhoods."1
6
178 See Hillsborough Castle Agreement, supra note 7, § 1, 2.
179 Policing and Justice Plan: Key Points, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/
northern ireland/8500172.stm (last updated Feb. 5, 2010, 11:34 GMT).
180 Mark Simpson, New Era for Policing and Justice in Northern Ireland, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/8613253.stm (last updated Apr. 12, 2010,
13:58 GMT).
181 Hillsborough Castle Agreement, supra note 7, § 1(8)-9).
182 Henry McDonald, Northern Ireland Talks: Latest Sticking Point is Policing and Courts,
GuARDIAN (U.K.) (Feb. 1, 2010, 11:26 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/01/nort
hern-ireland-policing-sinn-fein.
183 Hillsborough Castle Agreement, supra note 7, § 2.
184 Blueprint for New Parades Body, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/north
ern ireland/8632446.stm (last updated Apr. 20, 2010, 16:50 GMT).
186 See Shawn Pogatchnik, British, Irish Seek to Save Nlreland Government, BOSTON GLOBE
(Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2010/01/26/britishirish_
holdtalks to save northernirelandgovt/ ("[T]he Democratic Unionists held out for their
own controversial concessions, particularly the right of Protestant groups to resume marching
near hostile Sinn Fein districts. Britain has curtailed that explosive tradition over the past
decade with a powerful Parades Commission that the Protestants want abolished.").
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Lastly, the HCA stated that the First Minister and deputy First Minister
would examine any remaining business that had yet to be addressed from the
St Andrews Agreement.'87
IV. WHAT PARLIAMENT SHOULD DO TO EFFECTUATE A UNITED IRELAND
A. Work in Concert with Sinn Fin
Only fifteen years ago, the mere suggestion of working in concert with
Sinn Fin would have provoked laughter from everyone outside Parliament
and disgust from everyone inside Parliament. However, with time, both
parties and people change. Currently, Sinn F6in and the Parliament of the
United Kingdom share a common interest, which is the speedy and
successful devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and
Executives.
Sinn F16in has consistently demonstrated that its ultimate goal is a united
Ireland.'88 Rather than pursue this goal through an armed campaign, the
party agreed to the Good Friday Agreement-which states that the decision
to be a part of either the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland is to be
made by the people of Northern Ireland, and them alone 1S-and their
decision will be respected by both the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland. 190 Sinn Fdin has agreed to participate, and in many ways has led the
Northern Ireland Assembly. For example, Sinn Fdin convinced the PIRA to
disarm and successfully banished any thoughts of a return to violence.' 9'
The party has fought hard for devolution, agreeing to take a return of power
in small steps. In short, Sinn Fain has fulfilled all of its commitments and
will continue to work for a united Ireland via democratic methods and
peaceful processes.
Every Prime Minister of Britain, from John Major to Tony Blair to
Gordon Brown has made great strides in the peace process, and it appears
that David Cameron will do the same.19 2 They have all accepted Sinn Frin
187 Hillsborough Castle Agreement, supra note 7, § 5.
188 Excess of 500 Attend Irish Unity Conference in London, SINN FEIN, http://www.sinnfein.
ie/contents/18137 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
189 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 3, at 752.
190 Id.
191 See INDEP. MONITORING COMM'N, NINETEENTH REPORT, supra note 153, para. 2.8
(re orting that the PIRA has disbanded its "military departments").
See discussion supra Parts II, III (discussing John Major's role in the Downing Street
Declaration, Tony Blair's role in the Good Friday Agreement, and Gordon Brown's role in the
St Andrews Agreement). See David Sharrock, Cameron Ends Tories Long Silence with Sinn
Fein, TIMES (U.K.) (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article688
4640.ece.
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as a political party and negotiated with it.' 93 The United States government
has also devoted a substantial amount of effort to facilitate the peace process
and encourage further devolution. President Bill Clinton personally visited
Belfast several times and oversaw the Good Friday Agreement talks.
194
President George W. Bush hosted Ian Paisley and Martin McGuiness at the
White House in 2007.195 Similarly, President Barack Obama hosted Martin
McGuiness and Peter Robinson on St. Patrick's Day in 2009 at the White
House. 196 Additionally, in 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited
Belfast to make a speech to the Northern Ireland Assembly in hopes of
breaking the deadlock in the negotiations process and to encourage the two
parties to complete devolution.'
97
There is popular support for reunification among the people of Northern
Ireland as well. In 2009, elections were held for the European Parliament,
where Northern Ireland is currently allocated three of the United Kingdom's
seats. 98 In that election, Sinn Fdin received 26.04% of the votes, a higher
percentage than any other party in Northern Ireland. 99 This exceeded the
totals of the DUP, UUP, SDLP, and TUV.200 The support for Sinn F6in is
due, in part, to dissent within the ranks of the various unionist parties that
provides Sinn F~in with a claim as the largest party in Northern Ireland as of
2009. This distaste was further reinforced in the British Parliament elections
of 2010. While the DUP won three more seats in Parliament than Sinn F6in,
Sinn F~in received 25.5% of the popular vote, whereas the DUP received
25% of the total votes cast.20'
Likewise, Martin McGuinness has enjoyed a better reputation as a deputy
First Minister than both Ian Paisley and Peter Robinson ever experienced as
193 See discussion supra Parts II, III (discussing "The Troubles" and the Northern Ireland
peace process).
194 Clinton: His Role in Northern Ireland, BBC NEWS (May 23, 2001, 10:45 GMT), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/northern ireland/1346757.stm.
1 NI Leaders Return from US Mission, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/no
rthern ireland/7133858.stm (last updated Dec. 8, 2007, 9:09 GMT).
196 Scott Wilson, For Obama, a Shamrock-Sprinkled Schedule, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2009,
at A07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/17/AR2
009031703032.html.
197 Mary Beth Sheridan, In Northern Ireland, Hillary Clinton Urges Cooperation, WASH.
POST (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/12/A
R2009101200292.html.
198 RICHARD CRACKNELL, 2009 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, HOUSE OF COMMONS
LIBRARY 3 (2009), available at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/sns
g-04952.pdf.
Results of the 2009 European Elections, supra note 161.
200 See id. (declaring the vote totals as follows: DUP (18.23%), UUP (17.11%), SDLP
(16.2%) and TUV (13.66%)).
201 UK: Northern Ireland Results After 18 of 18, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shar
ed/election2010/results/region/6.stm (last updated Nov. 20, 2010).
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a First Minister. A recent opinion poll showed that Martin McGuinness is
actually viewed as Northern Ireland's most respected politician. 22 This is an
exceptional transformation from his early days as a rising IRA man in
Londonderry.2 °3 Besides his position as the deputy First Minister of the
Northern Ireland Assembly, Martin McGuinness is also a member of British
Parliament for the Ulster Mid district of Northern Ireland.20 4 Martin
McGuinness handily retained his Parliament seat,205 as did Gerry Adams.20 6
However, Peter Robinson lost his seat in British Parliament representing
Belfast East to an Alliance Party member by more than seven percentage
207points.
Since the people of Northern Ireland control whether or not their country
remains a part of the United Kingdom or becomes a part of the Republic of
Ireland, this continuing movement toward Sinn F~in can be viewed as a
growing endorsement of the desire for a return to home rule by the people of
Northern Ireland. At the very least this can be interpreted as a total
repudiation of direct rule from the British Parliament. In a 2008 survey, 71%
of Northern Irish people surveyed said they thought the long-term goal of
Northern Ireland should be as a united Ireland or as part of the United
208Kingdom, but with devolved powers.
B. Recognize that the DUP is Vital to Any Meaningful Northern Irish Policy
While the TUV may be relegated to fringe status, currently the DUP is
still arguably the largest Northern Irish party. Groups or individuals working
in concert with Sinn Fain must also get the DUP on board for changes. Peter
202 See Noel McAdam & Rebecca Black, Poll: Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness is Northern
Ireland's Top Minister, BELFAST TEL. (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/poli
tics/poll-sinn-feins-marfin-mcguinness-is-northem-irelands--top-minister-14580892.html (stating
that McGuinness received 27% of the votes, including 11% of the Protestant vote, whereas Peter
Robinson received only 7% of the vote overall, and 0% of the Catholic vote).
203 See id. ("[Slignalling a remarkable transformation from IRA leader to respected political
figrehead.").
A4 Martin McGuinness, PARLIAMENT OF U.K., http://www.parliament.ukIbiographies/martin
-mcguinness/25478 (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
205 Mid-Ulster: Martin McGuinness Holds Seat For Sinn Fein, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/election_2010/northemireland/8649939.stm (last updated May 7,
2010, 9:06 GMT).
206 West Belfast: Sinn Fein's Adams Tops Poll, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk
_news/politics/election_2010/northern_ireland/8646250.stm (last updated May 7, 2010, 7:25
GMT).
207 East Belfast: Alliance Takes First Seat At Westminster, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uknews/politics/election_2010/northern ireland/8646680.stm (last updated May 7,
2010, 8:28 GMT).
208 Political Attitudes, N. IR. LIFE & TIMES (June 4, 2009), http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2008/P
olitical Attitudes/N IRELND2.html.
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Robinson has expressed progressive intentions, saying, "I do not pretend that
the government we have at Stormont is perfect - no government is - but it
is infinitely more preferable to the only alternative: direct rule, with no say
for local people in how we are governed.,
209
The DUP must embrace two positive results from the arrival of the TUV.
First, the DUP's most extreme members are no longer members of the
DUP,2l ° so appeasing them is no longer a priority. For this reason, the party
has become more moderate. Second, the TUV can now be demonized by
others as the extreme right-wing unionist party,211 allowing the DUP to help
run the government without being the object of nationalist ire.
Parliament and Sinn Fin can help this process of involving the DUP by
seamlessly working with the DUP and its leaders. Sinn Fin and the DUP
must portray to the people of Northern Ireland the image that they are the
only two parties that can work together. Together, Sinn Fin and the DUP
represent a majority of the people in Northern Ireland, so collaboration can
prevent the minority parties from gaining power. This strategy was readily
apparent in the decision to nominate and vote for Alliance leader David Ford
for Justice Minister. Both the UUP and the SDLP put forth their own
candidates, but because the DUP and Sinn Fin were able to compromise,
each maintained its authoritative position.212 Perhaps most importantly, this
concerted work allowed the DUP to move from its anti-devolution position
to a more moderate, progressive position without losing their constituency,
which effectively allowed them to save face in the international community
and with Parliament. In short, if Parliament adopts a position more in line
with Sinn Fin, there will be a greater likelihood of moderating the DUP
position in order to hold off the TUV and UUP, which will bring about a
more stable government and successful devolution.
C. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Keeping Northern Ireland Part of
the United Kingdom
There is a lack of support within Great Britain for keeping Northern
Ireland. The British Social Attitudes Survey, which ran from 1983 to 2007,
209 Hopes of Breakthrough on Northern Irish Policing Powers, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Dec. 24, 2009,
7:34 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/dec/24/northern-ireland-policing-powers-brea
kthrough.210 See supra text accompanying note 161 ("[The DUP] had recently lost some of the most
'hardcore' members of the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) party.").
211 See supra text accompanying note 162 ("The TUV, founded in 2007, primarily consisted
of former DUP members who had taken an especially hard-line stance against dealing with
Sinn Fin at any level.").
212 David Ford Secures Justice Job, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/u k news/north
emireland/8615741.stm (last updated Apr. 12, 2010, 15:49 GMT).
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polled a random sample of Britons (excluding the Northern Irish), asking
them various questions.213 Within every survey participants were prompted
to answer a questions that indicated what they thought the long-term policy
be for Northern Ireland should be.214 Over the years, an increasing number
of British people favored reunification with Ireland as opposed to Northern
Ireland remaining a part of the United Kingdom. l5 The percentage of people
who responded "I don't know" has also increased from 5.76% in 1983 to
more than 18% in 2007.216 This question and its responses suggest that the
British favor a United Kingdom sans Northern Ireland at best, and at the very
least, that the British are increasingly apathetic about the issue.
While strong support for a united Ireland may not exist, there seems to be
a waning desire for Northern Ireland to remain a part of Great Britain. This
Note already mentioned the opinion poll showing that 71% of Northern Irish
favored either reunification or a devolved government.2 17  The growing
popularity of Sinn Fin can be seen as an endorsement of its central
platform-reunification with the Republic of Ireland.218
In Northern Ireland, between the lack of support both inside and outside
of Northern Ireland, as well as encouragement by the international
community, mainly the United States, the time may be approaching when the
costs of maintaining Northern Ireland outweigh the benefits. Currently, the
United Kingdom spends approximately £16 billion (about $24 billion)
annually on Northern Ireland. 219 An obvious, positive effect resulting from a
unified Ireland would be that those £16 billion could be spent within
England. In 1942, in the midst of India's struggle for independence, the
Labour Party of Britain "recognized [sic] the inevitability of Indian self-
determination. .... ,,220 They also professed that actively promoting Indian
213 Question: Do You Think the Long Term Policy for Northern Ireland Should Be for It...,
BRITISH Soc. ATTITUDES SURVEY, http://www.britsocat.com (log into "Brit SocAt log-in,"
using e-mail "gjiclseniomoteseditor@gmail.com" and Password "intemationall" and then
clicking "Login"; then follow "Contents List" hyperlink; then scroll down and click the box
next to "NORTHERN IRELAND"; then click the box next to "Long-term constitutional
arrangements"; then follow "Preferences for Years (2007 ... 1983)" hyperlink) (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Political Attitudes, supra note 208.
218 All-Ireland Development and Irish Unity, SINN FtIN, http://www.sinnfein.ie/unity-and-
all-ireland-development (last visited Nov. 20, 2010).
219 Syman Ross, Government Must Make Brave Choices on Northern Ireland Economy,
BELFAST TEL. (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uklbusiness/business-news/gove
rmnent-must-make-brave-choices-on-northem-ireland-economy-14650924.html.
220 ULF HEDETOFT, BRITISH COLONIALISM AND MODERN IDENTITY 223 (1985).
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independence would "transform ... a sullen subordinate into a willing
partner., 221 Like India, the same sentiment is applicable to Northern Ireland.
For all of these reasons, a separation of the British and Northern Irish
governments is inevitable, and the time has arrived for the British
government to act as it did with respect to India and turn Northern Ireland
from a sullen subordinate into a willing partner.
V. CONCLUSION
Here, the United Kingdom has a unique opportunity to save face on all
fronts by taking advantage of a situation that it will likely have to surrender
to anyway. While Parliament cannot outright cede Northern Ireland, as the
Northern Irish people control their own destiny, Parliament can push for
greater devolution and nudge the country toward Ireland. This outcome can
be achieved without violence or strife, and would allow the United Kingdom
to be the benefactor of a new, united Ireland. With the decommissioning of
paramilitary groups, the Protestant residents of Northern Ireland have little, if
anything, to fear from a majority Irish Catholic government. Because Sinn
F6in made it clear that they will not rest until there is a united Ireland, the
United Kingdom will have to battle endlessly if it wishes to keep Northern
Ireland. Therefore, now is an ideal time for the United Kingdom to concede
gracefully.
In an open letter in 2009, Gerry Adams discussed the importance of
establishing a united Ireland.222  While the violence has ended, the
underlying reason for the conflict remains-the British claim of jurisdiction
over a piece of Ireland.223 Gerry Adams identified three "interlinked
challenges" that Ireland and Britain must face, including "getting the British
government to change its policy from one of upholding the union to one of
becoming a persuader for Irish unity; getting the Irish government to begin
preparations for Irish unity; and engaging with Ulster unionism on the type
of Ireland we want to create. 224 The three agreements were steps in the right
direction because they reached out to both sides and established cooperative
governing structures. With responsible leaders and parties in control of
Northern Ireland, and little chance of a return to violence, Parliament in
London should act to fulfill their duties and commitments to completely
devolve power to Northern Ireland. This step would fulfill their obligations
set forth in the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement, and
221 Id.
222 Gerry Adams, A United Ireland Is Possible, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (July 15, 2009, 5:00
EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/1 5/united-ireland-gerry-adams.
223 Id.
224 Id.
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would give the people of Northern Ireland true self-determination to decide
their own fate, whether it is as part of the United Kingdom or as part of a
united Ireland.
In the same letter, Gerry Adams spoke of all of the substantial steps and
milestones that have been achieved by all the parties in the Northern Irish
peace process.225 These steps are the very things that most thought
impossible only decades ago. To quote Mr. Adams, "All of those difficult
and some said, unimaginable goals have been achieved. So - Irish
reunification is achievable. With the right strategies and a determined
commitment... a united Ireland can happen. Join us in that task.
226
225 See id. ("Some progress has already been made. The Good Friday Agreement has put in
place all-Ireland political institutions which can be enhanced and developed. It contains a
legislative, peaceful and democratic mechanism to set up a new and democratic Ireland.").
226 Id.
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